Given the rise of services preferentialism in the last decade and the importance of domestic regulation for services trade, this paper examines the role of regulatory incidence and convergence as determinants of services trade agreements (STAs). Our results suggest that regulation is an important determinant of STA membership. They also suggest that geography, common institutions and pre-existing trade matter more than economic size and factor endowments for addressing regulatory incidence and convergence in services negotiations. Finally, we nd that countries displaying greater regulatory convergence and less restrictive regulation are also more likely candidates for reciprocal services liberalization. JEL classication: F10, F13, F15
Introduction
More than three decades of research on trade costs and goods trade unveiled fundamental insights into the determinants (Baier and Bergstrand, 2004) , the relative magnitude and nature (Eaton and Kortum, 2002; van Wincoop, 2003, 2004) and the consequences of barriers to cross-border transactions Bergstrand, 2007, 2009; Bergstrand et al., 2013; Egger et al., 2011) of goods. However, much less is known about services trade and their impediments. Data on cross-border transactions of services became available only in the last decade, and data on service trade impediments have been collected and made available even more recently (for instance see Miroudot et al., 2012) . Even though a cottage literature started evolving around the matter (see Francois and Hoekman, 2010, for a survey) , key knowledge about fundamental drivers and consequences of service trade barriers is not available. This paper aims to bridge this gap by addressing the role of regulation in STA membership.
A striking feature of trade diplomacy in recent years has been the pace of preferential goods trade liberalization and rule-making. In the last decade, a similar trend has been observed regarding services trade. Of the 83 preferential trade agreements (PTAs) notied to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and in force prior to the year 2000, 73 (87.9%) featured provisions dealing exclusively with trade in goods. Since then and up until August 2013, another 176 PTAs have come into force of which 105 (59.7%) also include provisions on services trade 1 . This development indicates the rising importance of services trade in general, the growing need felt by countries to place such trade on a rmer institutional and rulemaking footing, and the attractiveness of doing so on an expedited basis via preferential negotiating platforms (Sauvé and Shingal, 2011) .
Unlike trade in goods, where the removal of border barriers retains signicant negotiating traction, domestic regulation is the sole currency of negotiations in services trade (Mattoo and Sauvé, 2010) . The importance and potentially trade-and investment-inhibiting impact of domestic regulation on service sector performance has received some attention in the literature (Kox and Nordås, 2007; Kox and Nordas, 2009 ). Regulatory incidence and heterogeneity have been shown to exert a signicantly negative impact on bilateral services trade via Mode 3 ( Strict and dierent regulation discourages outward investment as local rms nd it more dicult to enter foreign markets the more restricted they are at home, Kox and Nordas, 2009) , which is the most dominant mode of service delivery (for instance 1 As of 15 August 2013, the total number of STAs in force was 118. These included three alliances (MERCOSUR, EFTA and CARICOM) where an STA was negotiated after 2000 in addition to a pre-existing trade agreement in goods. see Magdeleine and Maurer, 2008; Hoekman and Kostecki, 2001) .
However, the role of regulation, both incidence and convergence, in STA membership has not been studied. Are certain countries more likely candidates for negotiated regulatory convergence from a services trade perspective? Moreover are countries displaying greater regulatory convergence also more likely candidates for deeper integration agreements in services markets? The role of geography in trade-facilitating regulatory convergence in services has also not been explored.
In a bid to expand trade volumes, the objective of an STA is two-fold: rst, to bring down the level and incidence of restrictive regulation in both markets and, second, to promote convergence, approximation (including through mutual recognition) and ultimately (but less frequently) to harmonize regulatory practices between trading partners. We would thus expect trading partners in a services accord to exhibit both lower incidence of regulation and regulatory heterogeneity compared to those not party to such an agreement. Conversely, the lower the incidence of restrictive regulation and regulatory heterogeneity in a trading dyad, the more likely it is to negotiate a services agreement. Signicantly, these propositions are validated by the analyses undertaken in this paper.
Related literature
Research on services preferentialism has been traditionally devoted to studying the trade eect of services accords on aggregate and disaggregated services trade ows (Pak, 2002; Grünfeld and Moxnes, 2003; Ceglowski, 2006; Kimura and Lee, 2006; Walsh, 2006; Lennon, 2008; Shingal, 2009; Francois and Hoekman, 2010; Marchetti, 2011; Egger et al., 2012; Shingal, 2013; Van der Marel and Shepherd, 2013) .
More recently, researchers have begun to explore the impact that diering levels of and heterogeneity in regulation exert on bilateral services trade ows (Kox and Lejour, 2006; Francois et al., 2007; Kox and Nordas, 2007; Schwellnus, 2007; Fink, 2009; Kox and Nordas, 2009; van der Marel and Shepherd, 2013) and to estimate barriers to trade in services and FDI and/or provide estimates of services trade costs (Francois et.al. 2007; Miroudot et al., 2010; Van der Marel, 2011; Miroudot et al., 2012) .
This literature has also evolved to explain services commitments in the GATS (Roy, 2011) , those made reciprocally (Marchetti et al., 2012) as well as GATS+ commitments in STAs (Van der Marel and Miroudot, 2012) .
However, the papers closest to ours are Baier and Bergstrand (2004) , who were the rst to examine the determinants of partners' propensities to negotiate trade agreements in goods, and Cole and Guillin (2012) and Egger and Wamser (2013) , who explored the issue inter alia for services accords. None of these papers, however, examine the role of regulation in STA formation. Studying the role of regulation in STA membership is thus the main contribution of our paper. This is done through recourse to a new World Bank dataset on measures of services (regulatory) restrictiveness, the STRI (Borchert et al., 2012a,b) . Baier and Bergstrand (2004) found the potential welfare gains and likelihood of a PTA in goods trade between a pair of countries to be higher: (i) the closer in terms of distance two trading partners are; (ii) the more remote they are from the ROW; (iii) the larger and more similar they are economically (in terms of real GDPs) to enable exploitation of economies of scale in the presence of dierentiated products; (iv) the greater is the dierence in factor endowments between them, leading to HeckscherOhlin trade; and (v) the smaller is the dierence in factor endowment ratios of the member countries relative to those of the ROW (leading to less inter-industry trade diversion). Baier and Bergstrand (2004) found these factors to have economically and statistically signicant eects on the probability of negotiating a goods agreement.
In comparison, Cole and Guillin (2012) examined a dyad's propensity to negotiate a services agreement and in their baseline specication found statistically signicant evidence only for the natural trading partner hypothesis, similarity in terms of economic size, and factor endowment dierences. Egger and Wamser (2013) found the determinants of goods and services trade agreements to be similar.
Empirical methodology
Our empirical framework draws on McFadden (1975 McFadden ( , 1976 qualitative choice models, where utility, here the (minimum or average) net gains for two countries from participating in an STA, is modeled as a latent, unobservable variable (y * ), which can be explained by a vector of explanatory variables (x). Since y * cannot be observed, an indicator variable ST A is used which takes the value 1 (indicating y * > 0) if two countries participate in a common STA and 0 (indicating y * ≤ 0) otherwise.
More formally, ST A ij = 1 if y * > 0 and P (ST A ij = 1)= P (y * > 0)= G(a + bx ij ). . . . . . . (1) where P is the response probability associated with a trading dyad (ij) signing a services accord; G(.) is a cumulative distribution function that ensures that P (ST A ij = 1) lies in the unit interval; and x ij is the vector of explanatory variables for a generic country pair.
Consistent with Baier and Bergstrand (2004) , empirically, (1) is estimated by a probit model, assuming normality about the error term in the latent process. Clearly, independent of the assumed cumulative distribution function, the non-linear nature of G(.) implies that the coecient estimates only reveal the signs of the partial eects of changes in x ij on the probability of signing a STA. Thus, the direction of the eect of variable x k on E(y * |x) = a + bx is only qualitatively (not quantitatively) identical to the eect of x k on E(ST A|x) = G(a + bx), where E(.) denotes the expectation operator.
The main objective of STAs is to increase trade in services between partners. Reducing levels of restrictive regulation and promoting regulatory convergence are important channels through which services accords expand services trade volumes. Thus, the determinants of a country's choice to negotiate a services accord are likely to be indistinguishable from those that inform whether certain countries are more likely candidates for a reduction in restrictive regulation as well as for regulatory convergence.
Thus, in distinct regressions, we explain the restrictiveness of services regimes in a dyad and regulatory heterogeneity between partners using the same set of controls as used for explaining STA membership.
where DREG ij is the absolute value of the dierence between the logs of the services trade restrictiveness index (ST RI) of two countries and ε is an error term.
where SREG lev ij is the sum of the levels of STRI of two countries and x is an error term.
We found the dependent variables in equations (2) and (3) to be characterized by heteroskedasticity which rendered a log-linear OLS estimation biased (see Colin and Trivedi, 2005; Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006) . Therefore we used Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) estimation for inference.
Explanatory variables
In their seminal work exploring the determinants of partners' propensities to negotiate bilateral trade agreements, Baier and Bergstrand (2004) documented that distance, remoteness, economic country size, and factor endowments were the main economic determinants of goods trade agreements and that their impact on empirical membership probability was consistent with economic theory. They also considered other institutional and political economy determinants in their sensitivity analyses. Following them, we use a largely overlapping set of determinants in our empirical analyses.
For any dyad ij, the vector x includes two geographical variables: N atural ij which is the inverse of distance between i and j and Remote ij which is the simple average of the mean distance between both countries and their partners.
where "d" is the bilateral distance in kilometers and dcont ij = 1 if i and j are located on the same continent, 0 otherwise.
Economic country sizes are represented by SRGDP ij , which is the sum of the logs of real GDP of country i and j and DRGDP ij , which is the absolute value of the dierence between the logs of real GDP of two countries.
DKL ij and DROW KL ij determine the role of factor endowments in countries' propensities to negotiate agreements. DKL ij is the absolute value of the dierence between the logs of capital-labour ratios of country i and j. Apart from DKL ij , Baier and Bergstrand (2004) suggest using SQDKL ij the squared value of DKL ij in order to control for the likely nonlinear impact of DKL ij on the net gains from participating in a trade agreement. Moreover, to account for dependence of i and j on each other, Baier and Bergstrand (2004) suggested including DROW KL ij which is calculated as the absolute value of the dierence between the logs of capital-labour ratios of countries i and j and those of ROW.
Institutional variables in x ij include common language, colonial antecedents and legal origins.
More importantly from the perspective of this paper, we also control for the level of services regulation in the dyad (SREG ij , which is the sum of the logs of ST RI i and ST RI j ) and regulatory heterogeneity between partners by including the absolute value of the dierence between the logs of STRI of both countries (DREG ij ).
In line with the endogenous protection literature (Treer, 1993) , we also control for import penetration by using data on countries' average bilateral merchandise trade (BT G ij ). To measure the average as well as the dierence in the overall supply and demand potentials i.e. comparative advantage in and openness to overall services trade for two countries in the past, we also include the minimum value of world services trade for two countries in a dyad [min(T rade S ij )] and the maximum value of world services trade for two countries in a dyad [max(T rade S ij )]. Finally, to control for historical policy alignment, we also control for active goods trade agreements in the year 1980 (GT A − 1980).
Testable hypotheses
The testable propositions from Baier and Bergstrand (2004) are likely to be similar for STAs as well. Thus:
1. Neighbouring countries are more likely to sign a trade agreement especially if both are remote from the rest of the world and this is likely to be true of services accords as well.
2. The natural trading partner hypothesis is also expected to hold true for STAs.
3. Similar and larger economically-sized countries are also likely to gain more due to the exploitation of economies of scale and the presence of greater varieties owing from deeper integration in services markets. 4. The greater the dierence in relative factor endowments between countries, and the larger the intercontinental trade costs, the more trade creation is likely to be. 5. The greater the dierence in relative factor endowments between potential partners and the ROW, the more likely trade diversion becomes.
6. Protection tends to be higher in sectors with greater import penetration. This means that more bilateral trade is likely to be associated with a lesser inclination to negotiate a trade accord.
A small maximum inclination towards world services trade [max(T rade S
ij )] is likely to be associated with lesser inclination towards liberalization due to large natural services barriers.
Moreover, given a small minimum inclination towards world services trade [min(T rade S ij )], a larger value of [max(T rade S ij )] implies historically more heterogeneity between countries, which is expected to be a source of less inclination towards liberalizing services trade reciprocally.
8. Dyads with common institutions and homogeneity in regulation are more likely to enter into agreements as are partners with low initial barriers to services trade.
9. Partners with existing trade agreements in goods are also more likely to negotiate STAs.
In estimating equation (1), we thus expect the coecients of Remote ij , N atural ij , SRGDP ij , DKL ij , SQDKL ij , GT A − 1980, min(T rade S ij ) and max(T rade S ij ), and the institutional variables to be positive while those of DRGDP ij , DROW KL ij , SREG ij , DREG ij and BT G ij , to be negative.
Data
Data on trade agreements are taken from the WTO's Regional Trade Agreements Information The CEPII gravity dataset (Head et al., 2010) provides geographic distances between capital cities, used to compute N atural ij and Remote ij . Data on real GDP and population are taken from the Penn World Tables (Heston and Summers, 2011) and these are used to calculate SRGDP ij and DRGDP ij .
We approximated factor endowment ratios K i /L i by using real per capita income (P CY ).
This was done since we measured time-variant determinants of STAs 14 years prior to the data of STA membership (prior to the entering of all STAs in the data). At that time, using the perpetual inventory method to estimate capital stocks as in Baier and Bergstrand (2004) would have led to an unjustiable loss of observations. Moreover, real per-capita income ratios are highly correlated with capital-labour ratios (see Egger and Larch, 2008; Bergstrand et al., 2010) 2 . Data on PCY are also taken from the Penn World Tables.
Data on common language and colonial antecedents are taken from the CEPII gravity dataset 2 The correlation coecient between real PCY and K/L in the subsample of our data for which both variables exist is close to 0.9. (Head et al. 2010) , while those on legal origins are compiled using La Porta et al. (1999) 
The measure of regulation in services markets used in this paper is the World Bank's Services Trade Restrictiveness Index (STRI; Borchert et.al. 2012 a, b) . Compiled from responses to questionnaires sent out by the World Bank to 79 developing countries on impediments to international integration and from publicly available information for OECD countries, the STRI is a quantitative index of restrictions on services trade encompassing 103 countries, 5 major service sectors and 19 sub-sectors. The information is also available by modes of service delivery. Figure 1 shows 1979. 6 This was the earliest year of the coming into existence of all these ten countries. 7 These were the earliest years for which services trade data were consistently available for all these ten countries.
A comparison of STRI by regions/groups in
<Insert Figure 1 here> A closer look at Figure 1 also provides an insight into the factors likely to inuence the choice of partners for negotiated regulatory convergence. For instance, high levels of per capita income (PCY), economic development and political stability all likely feature behind the observed homogeneity in STRI among OECD countries though there are signicant dierences in language, culture and distances within this cohort. In the case of ECA on the other hand, there is far more homogeneity in terms of language, culture and distances, though more dierences in terms of PCY and levels of development. This seems to suggest that a combination of these factors could determine which countries are potential candidates for negotiated regulatory convergence.
The STRI data are available for 103 countries, leading to 5253 [= (103 × 102)/2] possible dyads (treating pair ij and pair ji as the same dyad). There was an STA in force between 462 of these dyads until 15 August 2013. A preliminary analysis of the variables in x ij shown in Figure 2 reveals that STA members relative to non-members in our sample are closer in terms of distance but more remote, larger in terms of real GDP and more similarly-sized, have smaller dierences in PCY (and hence, relative factor endowments) with respect to each other but not compared to ROW, display less restrictive and more homogeneous services regulation, are more likely to have a common language, and exhibit higher (historical) levels of bilateral merchandise trade. The 103 countries in our sample are listed in Annex Table   A1 and all data are summarized in Annex Table A2. <Insert Figure 2 
here> 7 Estimation results
The results from the Probit estimation are reported in Table 1 . The rst three specications control for economic and trade determinants rst separately and then together. Specication 4 introduces institutional controls while specications 5 and 6 include combinations of these with economic and trade determinants. The nal specication 7 controls for all determinants together.
<Insert Table 1 here> The results reported in columns 1, 2 and 4 suggest that economic determinants exert a greater inuence than both institutional and trade factors though the model has the lowest explanatory power with the lattermost (pseudo-R-squared = 12%). Moreover, most of the variables within these three sets of determinants, with the exception of the factor-endowment proxies and common law, are individually statistically signicant.
As expected, less distant and more remote dyads, large sized economies with less restrictive and more homogeneous services regulation and a common language are more likely to negotiate a services accord. The coecients on DP CY and DROW P CY provide no evidence in these results for either Hecksher-Ohlin trade determinants in driving STAs or for any interindustry trade diversion. Counter-intuitively, these results also suggest that having common colonial antecedents reduces the propensity to negotiate a STA. The unexpected positive coecient on BT G ij seems to provide more evidence in support of the domino theory (Baldwin, 2006) than for the endogenous protection literature. While the GT A − 1980 variable drops out of these estimations, the positive coecients on min(T rade S ij ) and max(T rade S ij ) provide evidence for both supply and demand factors in fostering reciprocal services liberalization.
These results generally hold in specications 3, 5 and 6 though the explanatory power of the model is considerably improved when economic and institutional factors are combined.
When all factors are controlled for in specication 7, only Remote ij , N atural ij , DRGDP ij , services trade and the regulatory variables retain statistical signicance; these variables have the same impact as earlier. Interestingly, the explanatory power of this fully specied model is the same as that of the model with economic and institutional determinants being combined together; since the latter covers the full sample, we use it to assess our model's predictive power.
A comparison 8 of our model's predictions for STA using the specication in column 5 with the actual value of STA reveals that the propensity to negotiate (or not) a STA is correctly predicted for 93% of the dyads in our sample. Of the total, there was an STA between 462 dyads and 39.4% of these were correctly predicted by the model. The remaining 4791 dyads did not have a services accord and our model correctly predicted 98.3% of these. Matthews (1975) correlation coecient 9 , calculated from these predictions, reported a value of 0.49, indicating reasonable t between the actual and predicted propensities to negotiate STAs.
We also found evidence of insucient services preferentialism in our sample for 83 possible trading partner pairs reported in Table 2 wherein our model suggested the existence of a services accord which does not exist at the moment. At the same time, 280 dyads reported 8 To enable this comparison, we used the standard decision-rule for assessing probit models. If ST A pred > 0.5 then we take this value to be 1. If ST A pred <= 0 then we take this value to be 0. in Table 3 seem to exhibit excessive services preferentialism in all cases, both sets of trading partners have a services agreement though our model suggests a very low probability for this.
<Insert Tables 2 & 3 here>   7.1 Secondary results Table 4 reports the results from the PPML estimation of equation (2). As before, columns 1, 2 and 4 report the results from estimations that control for economic, trade and institutional determinants separately; columns 3, 5, 6 and 7 report results from estimations that include these variables in dierent combinations.
<Insert Table 4 here> At the outset, the explanatory power of the secondary estimation is low; even the fullyspecied model in column 7 has an R-squared of only 5.9%. This said, a few of the explanatory variables report expected signs on coecients. Thus, dyads more remote from ROW tend to be more homogeneous in services regulation the coecient on Remote ij is negative and statistically signicant across specications. Commonality in institutions is likely to result in a demand for (and greater supply of ) regulatory convergence we see evidence of this in the coecients on common colonial antecedents and common language in specications 4 through 7.
On the other hand, DRGDP ij reports statistical signicance, but unexpected signs. The result on the sum of economic size of trading partners is harder to interpret as our sample data suggest the near-absence of a relationship between market size and regulatory heterogeneity (correlation coecient = -0.05). The impact of combined market size on dierences in regulation is thus uncertain and perhaps this is what is reected in the near-zero coecient on SRGDP ij across specications in Table 4 .
The coecient on BT G ij is negative as expected and statistically signicant throughout specications. Sectors characterized by greater trade intensity are also more likely to see a convergence in regulation facilitating such trade. Finally, the positive coecients on min(T rade S ij ) are also in line with our expectations on historical regulatory heterogeneity.
While there are no established a priori for explaining the restrictiveness of services regimes in a dyad, results from the PPML estimation of equation (3) reported in Table 5 suggest more restrictive services regimes in a dyad if:
-it is more remote from ROW;
-the countries in the dyad are more distant from each other;
-it comprises smaller sized and dissimilar economies;
-it has larger dierences in factor endowments both between members and compared to ROW;
-it has lower levels of pre-existing bilateral merchandise trade or the absence of any institutionalized preferential trading arrangement in goods;
-there are dierences in language (though weakly signicant) between the members;
-if there is more minimum inclination towards world services trade and less maximum inclination; and -interestingly, if it has common legal and colonial antecedents <Insert These robustness results from equation (1) provide little evidence for the role of factorendowments or for common colonial antecedents in determining STA membership. On the other hand, these results provide more robust evidence for the positive role of a common language and counter-intuitive evidence for the negative impact of the common law variable.
The coecient on the min(T rade S ij ) variable also turns negative in specications 2 and 3, thus negating the role of supply forces in promoting services preferentialism. The remaining results in Annex Table 3 are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 1 : the impact of Remote ij , SRGDP ij and the regulatory variables is lesser than in the full sample and there is more robust evidence for the positive role of the BT G ij variable.
Annex Tables 4 and 5 report the robustness results from estimating equations (2) and (3) and these are found to be qualitatively similar in general to those reported in Tables 4 and   5 , respectively, though the GT A − 1980 drops out of these results.
In Annex Table 4 results, the coecient on N atural ij is statistically signicant while those on SRGDP ij and DROW P CY ij are weakly signicant; the common language variable reports a more robust presence in these results. However, the likely impacts of all these variables on regulatory heterogeneity in a dyad are the same as in the full sample.
In Annex Table 5 results, the one major dierence is the change in the sign of the N atural ij variable: the robustness results suggest that the restrictiveness of services regulation in the dyad is inversely related to the geographical distance between the countries, which is a rather interesting result. The impact of factor endowment dierences also acquires a nonlinear relationship now. The remaining variables retain impacts similar to those in the full sample.
Conclusion
This paper examines the role of regulatory incidence and convergence in determining STA membership. Our empirical results suggest that large-and similar-sized economies that are distance-wise closer and remote (from ROW), with lower levels of restrictive but more homogeneous services regulation are more likely to negotiate services agreements with each other.
Our results also suggest that remote and less similar-sized economies, with high levels of bilateral merchandise trade, common language and colonial antecedents are more likely candidates for regulatory convergence in STAs. Finally, the restrictiveness of services regimes in a dyad seems to be directly related to its remoteness from ROW, to the geographical distance between the countries and to their factor endowment dierences as well as interestingly to commonality in legal institutions and colonial antecedents. The incidence of services regulation in a dyad is also found to be inversely related to the sizes of and similarities between countries in terms of GDP, to levels of bilateral merchandise trade and pre-existing goods agreements. Our results suggest that regulation (both incidence and heterogeneity) are important determinants of STAs. They also suggest that geography, common institutions and pre-existing trade matter more than economic size and factor endowments for addressing regulatory incidence and convergence in services negotiations. Finally, we also nd that countries displaying greater regulatory convergence and less restrictive regulation are more likely candidates for reciprocal services liberalization. Note: Levels of signicance: #10% * 5% **1% ***0.1%; standard errors reported in brackets. The signs against the variables denote the expected signs of the coecients. Note: Levels of signicance: #10% * 5% **1% ***0.1%; standard errors reported in brackets. Table A5 : Robustness results from estimating equation (3) Note: Levels of signicance: #10% * 5% **1% ***0.1%; standard errors reported in brackets. Sample restricted to dyads for which an STA entered in force in the year 2008 and beyond.
